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Electricity markets in countries around the world are being restructured in
pursuit of economic efficiency through competition. However, volatility in
electricity prices and previous occurrences of market failure have indicated
a need to better understand the complex interactions between the various
market participants as well as to design market rules that maximizes efficiency
and security. In this project, the techniques of Agent-based Computational
Economics are employed to simulate the behavior of the participants in the
National Electricity Market of Singapore (NEMS) in order to understand the
ways in which they may react to changes in the underlying economic, financial,
and regulatory environment. A simulation platform is built with the proposed
model for Generator Company’s learning and it is tested in the conditions of
varying Vesting Contract Levels. The main contributions of this thesis are (a)
the development and test of a novel learning algorithm that more realistically
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Over the last three decades, electricity industries around the world are be-
ing restructured. The restructuring aims to increase efficiency by providing a
competitive environment. Market participants in the electricity market make
strategic decisions independently with incomplete information and learn to in-
teract with one another through repeated games. Modeling the behavior of
the electricity market is a challenging task due to the peculiarities of human
behavior such as learning as well as the special features of the electricity in-
dustry such as real time balance of demand and supply. The design for an
efficient electricity market requires a deep understanding about the effect of
market policies before implementation. Hence, there is a need for development
of powerful tools to model the behavior of the economic system.
The agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) approach is increasingly be-
ing employed for studying complex social systems (Epstein and Axtell, 1996).
Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) is a branch of agent-based mod-
eling (ABM) that focuses on computational economic modeling.
In the ACE environment, the agents learn how to evolve their strategic behav-
ior through artificial intelligence. The agent’s learning capability is modeled
using reinforcement learning (RL) methods. RL is inspired from psychological
14
theory and is an active area of artificial intelligence. RL is a general class of
algorithms in the field of machine learning that aims at allowing an agent to
learn how to behave in an environment, where the only feedback consists of a
scalar reward signal. The goal of the agent is to perform actions that maximize
the reward signal in the long run [1].
Agent-based Computation Economics (ACE) simulations may be useful tools
that support analysis in the process of engineering complex electricity market.
They offer the possibility of modeling agents that learn and adapt to their
environment. ACE simulation models may be used as fully controllable virtual
laboratories for testing economic design alternatives in order to determine the
particular market design that performs best in an environment of selfish agents.
Computational electricity market developed using the ACE approach provides
an artificial environment to model the market as complex dynamic system.
Under predefined market rules and structure, the intelligent agents learn how
to make decisions at micro-level based on asymmetric information and human
attributes. To constitute the laboratory the market framework is defined.
Accordingly, the market behavior is modeled as computational problems.
RL algorithms have been useful in simulating the behavior of strategic bidding
behavior of GenCo as observed in a large number of published studies about
agent-based models of the electricity market.
However traditional RL methods face some serious shortcomings. Existing
literature suggests that each RL-based agent uses only the past experiences
gained in a series of trials and errors. However, in the real world, the agent
uses both the past experiences and the available environmental information
before going on with trials and errors.
Our literature review indicates that GenCo agents are generally modeled with
single-dimensional, finite and discrete state and action space. The only found
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exception is a model [2] that allows the GenCos to make decisions in a single-
dimensional continuous strategy domain on pricing. However, GenCos take
into account more than one parameter (for example fuel prices, the time in
the day, demand forecast etc) before making an offer decision. In Singapore,
GenCos can offer their energy in up to 10 price/quantity tranches for each
facility for each half-hour [3]. In other words, the state and action space of
GenCos are multidimensional and continuous; existing models do not model
GenCo agents realistically.
The improvement of the RL method can provide a better response from the
simulation. Thus, the methodological advancement in this significant area of
ACE research is one of the focuses of this thesis.
1.2. National Electricity Market of Singapore
Singapore electric power industry is currently undergoing substantial changes
in both its structure (ownership and technology aspects) and its architecture
(operational and oversight aspects). For example countries in ASEAN have
been working towards under the ASEAN Power Grid project which will poten-
tial bring mutual benefits to electricity trade, including by allowing countries
to access new energy options that were previously unavailable or economically
unfeasible. The changes attempt to move the industry away from highly reg-
ulated markets with towards competitive markets in which prices more fully
reflect supply and demand forces. The goal of these changes is to provide
industry participants with better incentives to control costs and introduce in-
novations.
Nonetheless, the prominent example of the meltdown in the restructured Cal-
ifornia wholesale power market in the summer of 2000 has shown what can
happen when market mechanisms with poorly designed incentive structures
16
are implemented without sufficient pretesting. The result is partly due to the
lack of control of market power of generating companies [4]. Following the
California crisis, many energy researchers have eloquently argued the need to
combine sound physical understanding of electric power and transmission grid
operation with economic analysis of incentives in order to develop electricity
markets with good real-world performance characteristics.
The design of the electricity market is directly related to the three main goals of
energy supply: environmental sustainability, economic efficiency and security
of supply. The components of the electricity market has to be analyzed in order
for good market design to be derived. The question of which market rules and
which regulatory framework is the most appropriate to ensure efficient market
outcomes in the National Electricity Market of Singapore (NEMS).
1.3. Motivation
Agent-based Computation Economics (ACE) simulations may be useful tools
that support analysis in the process of engineering complex electricity market.
They offer the possibility of modeling agents that learn and adapt to their
environment. ACE simulation models may be used as fully controllable virtual
laboratories for testing economic design alternatives in order to determine the
particular market design that performs best in an environment of selfish agents.
ACE simulation models possess three advantages. First, it draws from Rein-
forcement Learning techniques to address the effects of incentives on human
participants behaviors. Second, there are various open source frameworks and
freely available technical discussions which allow users to experiment with new
software features, and a permit them to tailor software to specific needs. Third,
it facilitates intensive experimentation and sensitivity analysis and hence it can
be applied to large-scale real-world systems.
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1.4. Contribution of the thesis
The project combines aspects from statistics, machine learning, micro-economics
and power systems engineering.
It is not a trivial task to establish a well-functioning market for electricity, and
to set the right incentives that lead to an optimal outcome in terms of social
welfare.
In the process of building the model, in view of the shortcomings of the state-
of-the-art methods, a novel approach of modeling the behavior of Generator
Companies has been proposed.
The vesting contract is a policy specific to the Singapore electricity market
due to its market structure. Although the policy has been thoroughly exam-
ined through analytical means, it is, for the first time, incorporated into an
ACE simulation model. Simulation results may provide information on how
to design the vesting contract in order to better achieve its intended impact.
1.5. Problem statement
Literature review has indicated that GenCo agents are generally modeled with
single-dimensional, finite and discrete state and action space. However, Gen-
Cos take into account more than one parameter (for example fuel prices, the
time in the day, demand forecast etc) before making an offer decision. In Sin-
gapore, GenCos can offer their energy in up to 10 price/quantity tranches for
each facility for each half-hour [3]. In other words, the state and action space
of GenCos are multidimensional and continuous; existing models do not model
GenCo agents realistically.
Next, the vesting contract aims to curb market power in order to promote effi-
ciency and competition in the electricity market for the benefit of consumers.
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Economic analysis has shown that it removes the incentives for generation
companies to exercise their market power by withholding their generation ca-
pacity to push up spot prices in the wholesale electricity market. The vesting
contract level is also determined through the same means. There does not exist
a technique of assessing the impact of different vesting contract configurations.
Such a technique may provide a fresh perspective to the policy writing process.
1.6. Objectives
• Collect data of the Singapore electricity market
• Build a ACE simulation framework for the Singapore electricity market
• Develop a GenCo agent model that is capable of performing continuous
multidimensional state/action reinforcement learning
• Incorporate the vesting contract feature into the framework
• Make observations on the impact of different vesting contract configura-
tions
1.7. Scope of the project
The workings of an electricity market may be decomposed into several inter-
connected layers, including a regulatory layer, an economic layer and a physical
layer [5], as shown in figure 1.1.
The physical layer at the bottom of the figure 1.1 consists of the transmission
nodes and links that constitute the physical part of the electricity market. The
matching of load and supply at each node is done by the Independent System
Operator (ISO). The ISO is also responsible for the coordination, control and
monitoring of operation of the electrical power system. The physical layer
19
Figure 1.1.: Interaction layers
imposes constraints on economic and regulatory decisions which result from
the fixed capacities of transmission lines. Since transmission line congestion
is negligible in the Singapore context due to the well-developed network, this
project assumes that there is no constraint imposed by the physical layer and
that there is non-discriminating grid access, hence all economic decisions are
physically viable. Adjustable parameters may be incorporated to take into
account physical layer constraints in future works.
In the economic layer, GenCos make decisions to maximize their profits. Their
decisions take the form of supply bids. The demand bids are taken from real
data. The ISO serves as a central clearing house for the demand and supply
bids. This project models GenCos as maximum profit seeking agents as well
as an inelastic demand.
Market rules are set and market performance is monitored in the regulatory
layer. A specific feature in this layer in the NEMS, the Vesting Contract, is
modeled.
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1.8. Structure of the thesis
This thesis is structured as follows:
• Chapter 2 presents literature reviews on electricity markets, ACE meth-
ods, reinforcement learning methods, related software and the Singapore
electricity market.
• Chapter 3 explains the details of the proposed reinforcement learning
method as well as the verification process.
• Chapter 4 elaborates on the proposed model of the NEMS.
• Chapter 5 presents the simulation environment and results of NEMS
ACE simulation platform.




This literature review comprises of six parts. The first part explains the struc-
ture of the National Electricity Market of Singapore, which is the subject to
be modeled in this thesis. The second part summarizes a common trend in
the division of various necessary operations of the power system into different
market of physical trades. The third part presents the workings of deregu-
lated electricity market in various countries. The fourth part reviews exist-
ing Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) techniques that are used
to model electricity markets. The fifth part presents the existing open source
and proprietary software which implement ACE models on electricity markets.
The sixth part briefly presents models of the electricity market that are not
based on ACE. The seventh part presents the current reinforcement learning
methods. The final part explains how the result of the literature review leads
to the motivation of the thesis.
2.1. Structure of the National Electricity
Market of Singapore
2.1.1. Market participants
According to reference [6], the market participants of the National Electricity




• The transmission company
• Market Support Services Licensee
• Consumers
A. Generators
A generator meets the necessary energy demand through electrical generation.
In the NEMS, it is generally mandatory for all generators of 10 MW or more
to be licensed. Generators of below 10MW at a single location are generally
exempted from licensing as a generator and are licensed only as a wholesaler.
B. Retailers
The retailer may purchases directly from the wholesale market or may obtain
supply through the Market Support Services Licensee (MSSL). The retailer
may also offer the consumer other services, including billing and collecting of
transmission charges payable by the consumer.
C. The transmission company
The transmission network transports electricity at high voltage from generators
to the low voltage distribution network. SP PowerAssets owns the network
assets in Singapore and a management company. SP PowerAssets, being the
monopoly provider of transmission services, is not permitted to compete in the
energy market, whether as a generator, retailer or trader, because opportunities
exist for it to afford a preference to its competitive activities or its competitive
affiliates.
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D. Market Support Services Licensee
SP Services Ltd (the sole MSSL) provides the following market support services
to various parties:
Reading electricity meters and managing the data relating to meter reading
Facilitating access to the wholesale electricity market for contestable consumers
and retail electricity licensees
Facilitating the transfer of contestable consumers between retailers
Supplying electricity to non-contestable consumers
The MSSL has a specific role in the settlement of vesting contracts. The MSSL
is the counterparty to the generators for vesting contracts and will calculate
and settle vesting contracts with consumers or their retailers. The vesting
contract is explained in more detail in later in this Section.
E. Consumers
With the liberalization of the retail electricity market in Singapore, consumers
are now classified, based on their average monthly electricity consumption,
into:
• Contestable consumers: This group of consumers has a choice of who
they wish to buy their electricity from. They purchase electricity from
an electricity retailer, or indirectly from the National Electricity Mar-
ket of Singapore (NEMS) through the Market Support Services Licensee
(MSSL), or directly from the NEMS (provided the contestable consumers
are licensed by Energy Market Authority to trade in the NEMS and are
registered with Energy Market Company as market participants).
• Non-contestable consumers: These consumers, comprising mainly res-
idential electricity users and small sized businesses, are supplied with
24
electricity by the MSSL at regulated tariffs.
While non-contestable consumers are supplied with electricity at the regulated
tariff, contestable consumers have three choices to buy electricity:
• Buying electricity from an electricity retailer.
• Buying electricity directly from the wholesale market (NEMS) as a mar-
ket participant.
• Buying electricity indirectly from the wholesale market through SP Ser-
vices Ltd.
Both categories of consumers are essentially price-takers, and are therefore
exposed to the risk of price fluctuations in the market. Apart from the fact
that electricity is a necessity, consumer’s lack of market power can also be due
to their small size. There is no mechanism or process in which consumers can
submit their price preference in the Singapore electricity market. There is also
no bidding process that involves the consumers.
As the NEMS has yet to allow for demand-side bidding (year 2005), the de-
mand curve is represented by the forecast load at a system-set bidding price.
2.1.2. Singapore Energy Scenario
According to Reuters, we have a spare capacity of 50%. Our generating ca-
pacity is 9.8 GW while our peak demand is merely 6.5 GW. That is to say, its
going to be a long time, before all these capacities are eaten up.1(January 5,
2012).
As of December 2010, the total licensed generation capacity was 10,944 MW,






Vesting contracts were introduced on 1 Jan 04. The key policy objective of the
vesting contract regime is to curb market power in order to promote efficiency
and competition in the electricity market for the benefit of consumers. The
vesting contracts are bilateral electricity contracts between generation compa-
nies and SP Services. Under the vesting contracts, the generation companies
are committed to sell a specified amount of electricity (viz. the vesting contract
level) at a specified price (viz. the vesting contract price). This removes the
incentives for generation companies to exercise their market power by withhold-
ing their generation capacity to push up spot prices in the wholesale electricity
market.
EMA reviews both the vesting contract level and the parameters used to set
the vesting price every two years. The vesting price is set based on the long
run marginal cost (“LRMC”) of the most efficient generation technology that
accounts for more than 25% of the total electricity demand and taking into
consideration the key policy objective. The vesting contract level is set to
effectively curb the exercise of market power based on projected electricity
supply and demand. The current Vesting Contract Level is 55% of total load
forecast3.
The vesting allocation to the generators is in proportion to their respective
installed capacity [3]. EMA has imposed vesting contracts on the three large
generators (Senoko Power, PowerSeraya and Tuas Power) [6].
The Vesting Contract Reference Price is a function of 7 financial parameters




2.2. Markets for physical trades
In general, a number of markets exist servicing the power system of a country.
Most of these markets link directly to the physical delivery of electricity from
producers to consumers and to the physical stability of the power transmission
and distribution system to support the deliveries. Furthermore, other mar-
kets exist which facilitate or service the physical markets, e.g., concerning the
handling of financial risks. Not all of these markets are implemented in all
countries and some markets may overlap in the type of service they provide.
However, the organization of the power system into these markets seems to
be common across countries. These markets are listed below and described
briefly.
A. Bilateral Electricity Trade or OTC (over the counter) Trading
This trade is outside the exchange, and prices and amounts are not publicised.
B. Spot Market (day ahead)
Prices and amounts are based on supply and demand. Resulting prices and the
overall amounts traded are publicised. The spot market is a day ahead-market
where bidding closes at noon for deliveries from midnight and 24 hours ahead.
Hourly supply and demand is traded, but the market further supports block
bidding. This thesis aims to modelize the spot market.
C. Aftermarket (hour ahead)
The function of this market is to adjust and regulate power. Bidding closes 1
hour be-fore the operating/delivery hour. The products traded are one-hour-
long power contracts. Prices are publicised and based on supply and demand.
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D. Regulating Power Market (real time)
This physical real time market covers operation within the hour. The main
function of the this market is to provide power regulation to counteract imbal-
ances relative to planned operatio. Approved actors on the supply side of this
market can be both electricity producers and consumers.
E. Auxiliary Service Markets
The function of these markets is to provide and allocate. For example, primary,
secondary and tertiary reserves for safe operation of the system within the
operating hour, including frequency and voltage control. Furthermore, the
need for reserve capacity to counteract larger operation disturbances (e.g., due
to plant or grid failure) and black start reserves are generally allocated via
individual agreements. Auxiliary services cover a number of aspects relating
to the physical functioning of the power system, which may be looked upon as
(or split into) a number of different markets, each covering partly interrelated
products.
2.3. Overview on electricity market designs
around the world
The aim of this Section is to present basic ideas of the subject area as well as
observations on the development of electricity market around the world. The
specificity of the national electricity market of Singapore (NEMS) will also be
presented.
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2.3.1. Nature of the market
It is not possible, to keep electricity in stock, ration it or have customers
queue for it. Furthermore, demand and supply vary continuously. There is,
therefore, a physical requirement for a controlling agency, the transmission
system operator, to coordinate the dispatch of generating units to meet the
expected demand of the system across the transmission grid. If there is a
mismatch between supply and demand, the generators speed up or slow down
causing the system frequency (either 50 or 60 hertz) to increase or decrease.
If the frequency falls outside a predetermined range the system operator will
act to add or remove either generation or load.
In addition, the laws of physics determine how electricity flows through an
electricity network. Hence the extent of electricity lost in transmission and
the level of congestion on any particular branch of the network will influence
the economic dispatch of the generation units.
2.3.2. Country specific market design
Countries operate their respective wholesale electricity market with differing
set of market rules. However there are fundamental characteristics common to
all of them. Generator companies compete to sell electricity to retailers. The
retailers then sell the electricity at the market at a higher price most of the
time. Sometimes, the retailers can make a loss by selling at a lower price as
they are obliged to sell at a flat rate to end-users even during wholesale price
spikes due to unpredictable outages.
The bids from generators and consumers are matched at each node by the
classic demand and supply equilibrium model at a regular interval while taking
into consideration the physical constraints. A constraint can be caused when
a certain transmission line is overloaded.
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Each country has a different trading structures of power exchanges, as well as
type of trading structure. The working of the following markets in Europe are
explained in reference [8]:
• Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX) – The Netherlands
• Automated Power Exchange UK (APX UK) and UK Power Exchange
(UKPX) – United Kingdom
• Borzen – Slovenia
• EXAA – Austria
• GME – Italy
• Nord Pool – Scandinavia
• OMEL – Spain
• Powernext – France
2.3.3. Two-way bidding
Most power pools rely on the principle of one-way bidding, where offers are
only submitted by producers, whilst the market is subsequently cleared based
on a centralized demand forecast. By definition, these markets therefore imply
inelastic demand. Two-way bidding, on the other hand, also allows for bids
from buyers (suppliers), i.e. the market is cleared on the combined supply and
demand curves from generation and demand, respectively sellers and buyers.
Due to the necessity to serve all load, two-way bidding is usually implemented
in voluntary organized markets, or power exchanges, in bilateral contracts
markets [9].
Buyers bidding is a special characteristic not common to most markets except
in Germany and Spain. Outside Europe, demand side bidding is also permitted
in California and New Zealand [10].
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In Germany’s EEX continuous trading, sellers and buyers submit bids on a
particular single hour contract. They can also submit bids as well as can add
execution conditions and trading restrictions. A report [11] recommends more
reforms in the electricity and gas markets in order to set a level playing field for
the development of genuine competition, particularly with respect to network
access.
The Spanish system relies on such a day-ahead market where suppliers submit
their selling bids and prices for each hour of the day, submit using an e-
commerce marketplace, and buyers their demand bids as well. A unique feature
in Spain is the Objections to Competition Transition Costs (CTCs) regulatory
policy [12].
In the Spanish system, the demand side is made of distributors who purchase
the electricity demanded by the non-eligible consumers at regulated tariffs, the
retailers who sell electricity to the eligible consumers at unregulated prices, the
eligible consumers who choose to participate directly into the pool, and the
external agents. They submit demand functions specifying the maximum price
at which they are willing to purchase a given amount of electricity. The demand
functions can include up to 25 price-quantity pairs. The distribution companies
acquire the energy demanded by the consumers subject to regulated tariffs.
Hence, they typically act as price takers and submit flat demand schedules at
the price cap, 18.03 c€/kWh [12]. That is the reason why demand is modeled
as inelastic in the model [13] which aims to evaluate the impact of subsidies
on producer’s bidding strategy.
Another simulation prototype [14] based on the Spanish system addresses a
market structure where forward bilateral contracts to deliver certain amounts
of electricity for a particular day are known, as well as an auction mechanism
that allow buyers and sellers to post their bids for that same day.
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2.3.4. Recent development in demand responsiveness
Consumers buying electricity directly from generators is a relatively recent
phenomenon. While wholesale pricing used to be the exclusive domain of
large retail suppliers, increasingly markets like New England are beginning to
open up to end-users. Large end-users seeking to cut out unnecessary over-
head in their energy costs are beginning to recognize the advantages in such a
purchasing move.
Buying wholesale electricity is not without its drawbacks. Market players are
subjected to market uncertainty, membership costs, set up fees and collateral
investment. However, the larger the end user’s electrical load, the greater the
benefit and incentive to make the switch.
For an economically efficient electricity wholesale market to flourish it is essen-
tial that a number of criteria are met. Professor William Hogan4 of Harvard
University has identified these criteria. Central to his criteria is a coordinated
spot market that has "bid-based, security-constrained, economic dispatch with
nodal prices". Other academics such as Professors Shmuel Oren and Pablo
Spiller5 of the University of California, Berkeley have proposed other criteria.
An article [15] discusses measurements on demand elasticity, or demand re-
sponsiveness, in electricity market. Certain models (for example SMA) es-
sentially assume that market demand is unresponsive or perfectly inelastic.
Increased demand responsiveness can have significant impact on the ability of
suppliers to exert market power. Demand response must ultimately come from
retail customers. While the Commission has very little direct jurisdiction over
retail electricity markets, conditioning market based rates and merger appli-
cations on market demand responsiveness could have encouraging results in




Past market designs and regulation have not promoted innovations in devel-
oping opportunities for demand side responses in electricity markets. In fact,
many market rules in place today within ISO’s result from the lack of a real
demand response. These rules are poor substitutes for the benefits obtained
from real demand response. The volatility in wholesale has demonstrated the
importance of a demand response in times of scarcity.
Demand responsiveness plays a vital role in increasing efficiency and reducing
price volatility in the electricity markets. It allows customers to communicate
the value of electricity to the market. Increased demand responsiveness also
helps mitigate the adverse price effects of market power. Currently, advances in
technology are leading to innovative pricing structures and generation alterna-
tives to allow customers to better coordinate with the marketplace. Addition-
ally, increased responsiveness on any individual consumer’s part can benefit all
consumers through their impact on the overall market and such ability should
be encouraged to promote efficiency and stability in electricity markets.
Several mechanisms exist to allow consumer to react to price changes. For
example, a time-of-use pilot program for residential customers in Braithwait,
England. The utility communicates price signals to home thermostats that
could be set to automatically adjust to these signals. During peak demand
periods participants would be notified to reduce load and receive the higher
of $ 500/MWh or locational marginal price (LMP) times the amount of load
reduction.
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2.4. Review on applications of ACE on
electricity markets
Agent-based computational economics (ACE) is the area of computational
economics that studies economic processes, including whole economies, as dy-
namic systems of interacting agents. It encompasses several ongoing research
areas and applications to real world problems [16], of which the electricity mar-
ket is one. ACE simulations offer the possibility of modeling agents that learn
and adapt to their environment, and thus may be useful tools that support
analysis of a complex system such as the electricity market [17].
ACE models of the electricity market are fully controllable virtual laboratories
for testing economic design alternatives in order to determine market designs
that perform best in an environment of agents. The agents in ACE models of
the electricity market represent market players (GenCo, consumer, Indepen-
dent System Operator). The model is supplied with the initial configuration of
a computational economic system comprising these interacting agents. Next,
the model is allowed to develop over time without further intervention.
An article [18] critically reviewed a considerable amount of noteworthy papers
in agent-based electricity market research. It includes a table that summarizes
the core characteristics of the cited work and displays the similarities and dif-
ferences between the approaches. It identified some of the current problems
facing this research methodology that require further effort and a consolida-
tion of the approaches pursued by different research groups. Especially sound
argumentation for the choice of specific learning algorithms, more careful and
well documented validation and verification procedures as well as the appro-
priate publication of details of concrete simulation models are crucial for the
further development of agent-based electricity market modeling. The article
also highlighted unanswered issues and difficulties in this research field.
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2.4.1. Various applications of ACE modeling of the
electricity market
Most electricity related research is centered around the normative research
with the aim of determining good market designs thaave little opportunity to
exercise market power. However, there are broader research questions can be
approached using the ACE modeling method.
A. Analyzing trading arrangements
The agents adjust their bidding strategies according to their last round’s suc-
cess; they either lower, raise, or repeat their last bid price, depending on
whether their utilization and profit targets have been met in the last round,
or not. The demand side of the market is modeled as a static aggregate load
curve with limited price sensitivity.
B. Investigation of collusive strategies by generator agents
Demand is price-inelastic and can be classified as either high or low, while
there is some uncertainty about the exact level. On the demand side, high
overall demand, high uncertainty and low price elasticity facilitates tacit col-
lusion (measured as the joint profit ratio). On the supply side, situations in
which tacit collusion is easier to achieve are characterized by symmetry in cost
and capacity, and small hedging contract quantity. Also, the influence of the
number of competing generator agents on the success of collusive strategies is
examined. As expected, there is an increasing number of agents makes it more
difficult for them to collude in a sustainable way.
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C. Investigation of effects of vertical integration in the energy sector
Rupérez Micola et al. (2006) present a model that consists of three sequential
oligopolistic energy markets representing a wholesale gas market, a wholesale
electricity market and a retail electricity market. They analyzed the effect of
reward interdependence in vertically integrated energy firms.
D. A platform for agent learning behavior simulation
Agents are able to learn to achieve their goals, but the way in which learning
takes place is implemented differently in almost all models. Parameter values
in models are often not justified properly and are not fully revealed. The choice
of learning algorithm and model is hardly argued and justified in any paper.
Hence it might be interesting to discuss if there is any meaningful minimum
level of rationality that agents participating in electricity markets should be
endowed with. A popular learning algorithm is Q-Learning.
E. Market dynamics and complexity
Most works simplify real-world markets significantly. They are highly stylized
to the extend that they cannot claim to be more realistic than traditional
equilibrium models. It might be interesting to examine out-of-equilibrium
dynamics or the way towards an equilibrium, as well as the case of multiple
equilibrium. The characteristics of the time series of prices can ).be examined
in more details (e.g. price volatility price spikes). It might be interesting
to compare the efficiency of market outcomes in a bilateral setting with that
of a centralized auction. Moreover, vertical integration could be realistically
modeled in agent-based simulations, but is neglected in current models.
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F. Market Power Analysis
In reference [19], a fuzzy estimator gathers the aspects of market power in
a unified framework and uses them to measure exercised market power. In
the simulation, the power suppliers use Q-learning to learn how to respond to
competitor’s behavior and market conditions. The simulation is based on a
certain electricity market framework and a model for power supplier’s strategic
behavior. Simulation is done for a perfect competition scenario, a peak load
scenario and a congestion scenario.
Reference [20] proposed two approaches to analyze firm-based market power.
One is an application of the transmission-constrained residual demand Jaco-
bian, while the other is a generalization of the “residual supply index” to the
case of transmission constraints. Computationally efficient implementations of
both approaches show that they are able to cope with large-scale systems.
2.4.2. Modeled Electricity Market
This literature review has found ACE models using the market design and
data set of the electricity markets of the following countries.
• Columbia [21]
• Europe (Germany, Switzerland, France and Italy) [18]
• Indonesia [22]
• Iran [23]




2.4.3. Test beds for agent-based simulation of electricity
market
This Section consolidates the findings on existing simulation frameworks and
data sets.
The AMES framework [16] has been developed for wholesale market reliability
testing. The demand side is simplified to a fixed and price insensitive daily
load profile submitted to the Independent System Operator (ISO). The gener-
ator agents learn to optimize a supply function. Simulation results show that
all generator agents learn to successfully submit bids above their true marginal
cost. This leads to total variable costs of operation that are about three times
higher then they are in the case in which generators report their true marginal
costs. The authors conclude that the Wholesale Power Market Platform design
features do not prevent the considerable exercise of market power by gener-
ators. Further extensions of the AMES model are envisaged. To encourage
these extensions, the developers of the AMES test bed have released it as free
open-source (Java) software.
A simple hypothetical two-node power system with two and eight competing
GenCos was used to demonstrate the development of tacit collusion among
generators under competitive conditions [28]. The SA-Q-learning algorithm
was used to model GenCo behavior. The author recognized that the assump-
tion that the constant nodal load demand vector and the constant transmis-
sion system conditions (line status, parameters, and limits) in all stage game
repetitions was not realistic. However the objective was not to simulate the
real-world conditions but to study if the agents were able to learn to respond
to a specific environment.
A new optimal bidding function was developed and tested based on a modified
IEEE 30-bus system [29]. Demand was categorized into two groups - one that
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highly values reliability and one that does not - and the two types were modeled
separately. Demand-side participation was shown to be able to enhance market
efficiency.
A detailed model of the Spanish system, where companies trade through a
uniform price pool-based spot market was used in [24]. It modeled market
power in this pool, through agents offering, to generate the conjectured price
responses estimated from supply function equilibrium assumptions. A forward
market was introduced, with price formation following the conventional finan-
cial perspective of expected spot plus a risk premium. The finding was that
larger companies prefer to exercise market power in the spot market, while
smaller companies prefer to contract forward.
Simulation scenarios were constructed [30] for evaluation of the proposed PJM-
like market power mitigation rules of the California electricity market. Simu-
lation results showed that in the absence of market power mitigation, GenCo
agents, facilitated by Q-learning, were able to exploit the market flaws and
make significantly higher profits relative to the competitive benchmark. The
incorporation of PJM-like local market power mitigation rules was shown to
be effective in suppressing the exercise of market power.
A multi-area power system (with 11 zones and 17 transmission lines) was used
to test a proposed fuzzy Q-learning method [31] which model GenCo strategic
bidding behavior. The algorithm selects the bidding strategy according to the
past experiences and the values of the parameters, which show the human’s
risk characteristic. It was shown that it produced performance improvement
in comparison to the Q-learning with fixed parameters. The same multi-area
power system is used again by the same authors to test the capability of a
proposed fuzzy estimator [19] to monitor and diagnose the exercise of market
power by power suppliers.
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In [32], a hypothetical numerical example is used as case study to investigate
the impacts of emission trading and RESS on electricity market operation.
Replicator dynamics algorithm was employed to study the bidding strategies
of GenCo. Some indices were employed to examine the market operation
performance and used to analyze the impact of ETS and RESS. The modeling
and analysis of different scenarios showed that the implementation of both ETS
and RESS could lead to sustainable CO2 emission reduction and optimization
of structure of future energy sources.
Real data from the Iberian market, extracted from OMEL (www.omel.es), was
used as a test bed to simulate [25] various types of markets - bilateral contracts,
forward market, day-ahead spot market, balancing market.
A simulation [23], using the generation portfolio of the Iranian electricity indus-
try, illuminated the nature of tacit collusion and capacity withholding. In the
context of the infinitely repeated game paradigm, the authors demonstrated
the link between market design and tacit collusion that allows firms to behave
strategically, resulting in a deterioration of economic efficiency.
InterNet-based Power Market Simulator (NetPMS Ver.1.2) was introduced in
reference [33]. For testing the correctness and applicability of NetPMS in
semiconcentrated/concentrated real-time electricity markets, 9-bus and 30-bus
IEEE test systems were studied, respectively, as case studies. NetPMS can be
used to design a real-time market model that can be easily run through various
objective functions.
2.4.4. Summary on state of the art ACE modeling of the
electricity market.
Many papers lack information about empirical model validation. Results are
hardly validated against market results observed in any real-world market be-
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cause information on marginal-cost functions, bilateral contract obligations,
operating constraints or other power system characteristics is not sufficiently
available. With no quality measure for assessing the learning algorithms
and with-out validation against empirical data, it becomes difficult to judge
whether the model is appropriate for realistic electricity market modeling.
Guidelines and validation techniques for agent-based electricity models would
benefit the research quality in this field.
2.5. Software frameworks
This Section presents the software frameworks considered for their usefulness
to the thesis. The investigated frameworks are:
• Agent-based Modeling of Electricity Systems
• Recursive Porous Simulation Toolkit
• PowerACE
• Trade Network Game
• Genetic and Evolutionary Algorithm Toolbox
• MATPOWER
Only the first two frameworks in the above list have proved to be useful. The
Agent-based Modeling of Electricity Systems has been chosen as the simu-
lation framework on which the Proposed Reinforcement Learning algorithm
has been benchmarked against the Variant Roth-Erev Reinforcement Learn-
ing algorithm. The Recursive Porous Simulation Toolkit provided a simulation
platform that accelerated the development of the ACE model of the NEMS.
The other four software deal with aspects of the electricity market that are
outside the scope of this thesis.
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A. Agent-based Modeling of Electricity Systems
Agent-based Modeling of Electricity Systems (AMES)6 is an agent-based com-
putational laboratory suitable for studying the dynamic performance of re-
structured wholesale power markets in a manner that addresses both economic
and engineering concerns. A key aspect of the AMES project is the release of
AMES as open-source software to encourage interdisciplinary communication
and cumulative enhancements [27].
AMES models electric power sellers (generation companies) with learning capa-
bilities interacting over time with electric power buyers (load-serving entities)
in an ISO-managed wholesale power market. This market operates over an
AC transmission grid subject to congestion. The ISO manages congestion on
the grid by means of LMPs derived from optimal power flow solutions.
B. Recursive Porous Simulation Toolkit
The Recursive Porous Simulation Toolkit (Repast) Suite7 is a family of ad-
vanced, free, and open source agent-based modeling and simulation platforms
that have collectively been under continuous development for over 10 years. It
is maintained by a non-profit organization called the Repast Organization for
Architecture and Development (ROAD). The Repast development project is
constantly being expanded, refined and improved by the open source commu-
nity.
This thesis makes use of Repast Simphony 2.0 Beta, released on 12/3/2010.
It is a richly interactive and easy to learn Java-based modeling system that
is designed for use on workstations and small computing clusters. One of the




and is recommended by some as the tool of choice for agent-based computa-
tional social science research. A survey [34] has been conducted on some of
the major platforms including Repast, Swarm, Starlogo, Agentsheets and oth-
ers. Repast was found provide a comprehensive library which is extensible to
accommodate more complicated simulations as compared to the others.
C. PowerAce
A paper [35] presents he use of the PowerACE8 simulation platform to simulate
players within the electricity sector in Germany. It focuses on the retail market
and the interactions between suppliers and household consumers. The aim is
to explain the increasing electricity prices since 2000.
The model presented assumes a bilateral market where producers can offer
different pricing schemes and customers are free to choose from them.
The results of the simulation reproduced the main features of the real market
development in Germany. The article suggests that only when customer’s
market participation was to increase considerably, suppliers would be forced
to keep their price level or even to supply at marginal costs.
This research project has terminated in October 2007.
D. Trade Network Game
Trade Network Game9 (TNG) is a framework for studying the formation and
evolution of trade networks among strategically interacting traders (Buyers,
Sellers, and Dealers) operating under variously specified market protocols. The
TNG blends and extends standard matching theory and sequential game theory




with (partner selection) and how to behave in any trade interactions that take
place (strategy selection).
More precisely, in the TNG, successive generations of resource-constrained
traders choose and refuse trade partners on the basis of continually updated
expected utility. This partner-seeking process requires the traders to talk back
and forth with each other at event-triggered times. Once trade partners are
determined, the partners engage in bilateral trade interactions modeled as
2-person games. The traders use genetic algorithm learning to evolve their
trading strategies over time based on outcomes from their past trade interac-
tions.
E. GEATbx - The Genetic and Evolutionary Algorithm Toolbox for
Matlab
The Genetic and Evolutionary Algorithm Toolbox10 contains a broad range
of tools for solving real-world optimization problems. They not only cover
pure optimization, but also the preparation of the problem to be solved, the
visualization of the optimization process, the reporting and saving of results,
and as well as some other special tools.
The cost of the toolbox is 400 Euros.
F. MATPOWER
MATPOWER11 is a package of MATLAB® M-files for solving power flow
and optimal flow problems. However, this software does not implement the




2.6. Review on non-ACE model of the
electricity market
A model [36] is created to evaluate the effects of unit outages and fuel cost
uncertainty on Nash equilibrium quantities and market prices under Cournot
competition. The Nash equilibrium is obtained by combining the KKT first-
order optimality conditions of the optimization models of each firm. The
stochastic model used is described in a detailed manner.
The Lagrangian relaxation algorithm was the only practical means of solving an
Independent System Operator (ISO) scale unit commitment problem. Mixed
integer programming formulation by means of branch and bound tractable
may not mitigate these issues but can help to reduce surplus volatility and
differences to some extent [37].
A work [38] presents an alternative and new methodology for energy trans-
mission cost allocation based on an optimization/game-theoretic framework
(Aumann-Shapley). Computational results were presented for the Brazilian
power system and compared with those obtained by three other methodolo-
gies.
A new and very easy method to compute accurate forecasts for electricity prices
using mixed models is proposed. Several methods corresponding to different
combinations of factor levels (convenience or not of analyzing separately the
prices in working days and weekends and length of the time series used to
forecast) are compared. The mixed model is built combining the advantages
of several of these methods. Some numerical results for the Spanish market
are shown in reference [39].
Co evolutionary computation (CCEM) is found to be an effective and powerful
approach for electricity market analysis. The standard Cournot model and the
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newly presented Pareto improvement model are combined together to form an
integrated framework to analyze both the one-shot and the repeated electricity
market games [40].
A recent state-of-the-art literature analysis presents the wide range of ap-
proaches for modeling GenCos’ bidding strategy [41]. They include mathe-
matical programming, game theory and agent-based models.
A formulation of a stochastic game model for the energy market and its rein-
forcement learning-based solution methodology are presented in reference [42].
Though this work is rich with game theoretic treatments for deregulated en-
ergy markets, the problem within a mathematical programming framework,
and not a ACE framework.
In a paper [43], suppliers’ bidding strategies in a day-ahead energy market are
investigated for both auctions by using a game theoretic framework with Nash
equilibrium as the solution concept.
This paper addresses the bidding problem faced by a virtual power plant (VPP)
in a joint market of energy and spinning reserve service.
Reference [44] proposed a bidding strategy is a non-equilibrium model based on
the deterministic price-based unit commitment (PBUC). The presented model
creates a single operating profile from a composite of the parameters char-
acterizing each distributed energy resources (DER) and incorporates network
constraints into its description of the capabilities of the portfolio. The pre-
sented model is a nonlinear mixed-integer programming with inter-temporal
constraints and solved by genetic algorithm (GA).
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2.7. Review on use of reinforcement learning in
ACE modeling of electricity market
Literature confirmed the usefulness of using RL methods in agent-based mod-
els of the electricity market. ACE simulation models draw from RL techniques
to address the effects of incentives on human participants behaviors. The
behaviors of suppliers and consumers under the New Electricity Trading Ar-
rangement in England and Wales electricity market have been studied based
on RL methods [26]. The Roth-Erev learning algorithm [45] has been used
to analyze the effects of agent’s behavior and market structure on the market
power [46].
This Section reviews on the two most commonly used RL method and explains
the major disadvantage of these methods.
2.7.1. Simulated Annealing-Q-Learning
Simulated Annealing Q-Learning (SAQL) is the result of introducing the Metropo-
lis criterion from Simulated Annealing algorithm into the action-selection strat-
egy of Q-Learning. SAQL has been used to model GenCo’s strategic bidding
behavior [47, 48].
The origin of the SAQL is the classic Q-Learning algorithm. The Q-Learning
algorithm characterizes the way in which the agent interacts with the states of
the environment. Each state in the state set S includes a set of variables that
describes the status of the environment, i.e. S = {s1, s2, ..., sN} is a finite set
of possible states of the environment. Each action in action set A represents all
possible moves of the agent, i.e. A = {a1, a2, ..., aM} is a finite set of admissible
actions which the agent can take. At each time step t, the agent selects an
action at = a ∈ A as a function of the current state st = s ∈ S. The agent
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receives an immediate reward rt+1 as a result of the action.
A Q value is defined and calculated for each admissible state-action pair (s, a).
Each agent attempts to discover the optimal policy pi∗(s) ∈ A to maximize the
Q value of each state over time, or maximize the total reward that it gains.
The Q values are modified during the learning episodes based on the reward
received. The action candidates are prioritized on the basis of past experience
(exploitation) while all the actions still have a probability of being selected
(exploration).
In this thesis, the simulated annealing Q-Learning (SAQL) is used to bench-
mark against the proposed RL in a case study.
A. Learning
Algorithm 2.1 describes how the action at ∈ A is selected given the state of the
environment st ∈ S. The Q-value table of each GenCo is updated through a
simple value iteration update method after doing action at ∈ A and receiving
reward rt+1 as a result of the action.
In this algorithm, the knowledge on how st+1 would vary according to st is not
required. Hence there is no assumption on st+1 given st .
The temperature dropping function is as follows: Tn = Tn−1, where n is a
natural number and β is a constant number close to 1 to ensure a slow decay
of the temperature.
B. Limitations of SAQL in electricity market simulation
Among all the RL methods, the Q Learning is easier to implement and is an
effective method in slowly varying non-stationary environment [31].
There are two limitations of SAQL. Firstly, it is restricted to discrete state and
action spaces. Secondly, there is no guarantee for SAQL to converge to the
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Algorithm 2.1 SAQL action-selection algorithm
Initiate arbitrarily all Q(s, a) values
For each learning episode
Select a random action ar, where ar ∈ A
Select ap, where ap = arg maxa(Q(s, a))
Generate a random number ξ ∈ (0, 1)




Execute the action a, receive the immediate reward r, then observe the new
state s′
Q(s, a)← Q(s, a) + α ∗ [r + γmaxa′Q(s′, a′)−Q(s, a)]
s← s′
T ← λ ∗ T
End for
where
α : learning rate
γ : discount factor
T : temperature
λ : temperature decay constant close to 1
optimal policy in a non-stationary and non-Markovian environment such as the
electricity market. Q-Learning is based on the MDP mathematical framework
which is used for modeling decision making in situations where outcomes are
partly random and partly under the control of a decision maker. However
the pricing outcomes of the electricity market do not follow the rules of MDP
because they are influenced by numerous decision makers.
2.7.2. Variant Roth-Erev Reinforcement Learning
Alvin Roth and Ido Erev originally developed [49] and later refined [45] their
algorithm to model how humans perform in repeated games against multi-
ple strategic players. In response to a short coming of the algorithm found
by Koesrindartoto [50] regarding the updating choice probabilities when an
agent receives zero valued rewards, a variation of this algorithm was devel-
oped by Nicolaisen et. al. [46]. The variant Roth-Erev algorithm has been
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implemented for this project. An implementation of the variant Roth-Erev
algorithm is available in the “Java Reinforcement Learning Module for the Re-
cursive Porous Agent Simulation Toolkit” contributed by Gieseler [51]. How-
ever, our implementation of the algorithm is independent from the code in the
toolkit.
A. Basic Roth-Erev Learning
The Roth-Erev learning is a stateless algorithm. Instead of taking into account
the states of the environment in which the learning agent is situated, it bases
learning solely on the last action chosen and the reward received for that
action. In addition there is no explicitly defined policy or value function.
However there is a probability distribution over action choice.
The Roth-Erev learning algorithm operates by associating propensity values
with all possible action choices in the action space. These propensities are
translated into a probability distribution that governs future action selection.
Let qj(t) be the propensity for action choice j at time t , where j is one of n
actions in the action space and t is a count of passing learning cycles. Then
the probability that j is selected at time t is given in equation (2.1) taken from





In the AMES framework, a variant of the probability, given in equation (2.2),
is used [27]. C is a cooling parameter that affects the degree to which the
agent makes use of propensity values in determining its choice probabilities.
As C →∞, then pj(t)→ 1/N , so that in the limit the agent pays no attention
to propensity values in forming its choice probabilities. On the other hand, as
C → 0 , the choice probabilities become increasingly peaked over the particular
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supply offers m having the highest propensity values qm(t), thereby increasing





During initialization, all action choice propensities are initialized with the same
initial propensity value, qinit . As such, the probability of selecting any action
choice is equal.
The reinforcement function proposed by Roth and Erev in [45] is stated in
equation (2.3) taken from [45].
qj(t+ 1) = [1−φ]qj(t) + Ej(, j, k, t) (2.3)
The recency parameter φ determines to what degree the recent past has greater
bearing on present action choice than the distant past. That is, it determines
how quickly past rewards for actions fade from memory. It does this by de-
caying older propensity values each update period. As φ increases, the new
propensity for action j, qj(t + 1), gets less of its previous value, qj(t). Con-
sequently, the propensity value built up from previous rewards has a weaker
influence on the new value.
The basic version of an experience function is defined in equation (2.4) taken
from [45] .
Ej(, j, k, t) =

rk(t)[1−] if j = k
rk(t)

N−1 if j 6= k
(2.4)
The experience function contains an experimentation parameter . This affects
the how likely an agent is to choose actions similar to actions that have chosen
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in the past. Here the reward is partially distributed to all action choices and
helps to encourage experimentation over the whole domain. This is a form
of reward spillover that is meant to help strike a balance between exploration
and exploitation [51].
B. Variant Roth-Erev Learning
The Variant Roth-Erev algorithm is introduced because the basic Roth-Erev al-
gorithm suffers from a problem that can hinder the learning process in contexts
where the agent may receive zero valued rewards. When an agent performs
an action and receives a reward value of zero, experience function (2.4) result
in no changes in the action choice probabilities. The experience function will
zero out, and all propensities are all equally reduced by the recency parameter.
Thus, all action choices retain the same relative probability. This can slow the
leaning process since the agent will need to choose at least one more action
to change the choice probabilities. Koesrindartoto [50] originally identified
this problem and demonstrated its potential adverse affect in double-action
experiments involving Roth-Erev learners.
To address the problem of updating with zero-valued rewards, Nicolaisen et
al. [46] proposed the following modification, to form the variant experience
function given in equation (2.5).
Ej(, j, k, t) =

rk(t)[1−] if j = k
qj(t)

N−1 if j 6= k
(2.5)
Here unselected choices receive a portion of their old propensity values rather
than a portion of the reward. The propensities for all choices will still undergo
the forgetting effect, being degraded by recency. However, the propensities for
unselected actions will not degrade as much as for the selected action. Thus
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Algorithm 2.2 Variant Roth-Erev Reinforcement Learning Algorithm
1. Initialize all action propensities to the initial propensity value qinit and
initialize the action choice probability distribution to a uniform distribution.
2. Generate choice probabilities for all actions using current propensities.
3. Choose an action k according to the current choice probability distribution.
4. Update propensities for all actions using the reward for the last chosen
action k.
5. Repeat from step 2.
the new relative choice probability for the selected action will decrease more
than the choice probabilities for non-chosen actions, encouraging the agent to
select other actions in the future.
The Variant Roth-Erev Reinforcement Learning (VRERL) uses the variant
experience function given in (2.5). Algorithm 2.2 presents the pseudo-code.
More explanation of the VRERL and a version implemented in JAVA can be
found in reference [51].
2.7.3. Continuous state and action space problem
Many researchers have identified a major shortcoming of the use of RL in ACE
models: RL algorithms cannot realistically model the state and action space
of the GenCo. Their recommendation points towards a common direction.
It is suggested in reference [31] that in order to get better response from the
agent-based simulation, it is worthwhile to develop suitable methods for con-
sidering the continuous state space in reinforcement learning and also better
usage of available information in handling the market uncertainty.
A drawback of the Q-Learning model for GenCo agents is that it may suffer
from the curse of dimensionality if there are too many decision variables. A
suggestion [30] to overcome this weakness is to design a learning algorithm for
electricity market participants that combines the strength of both Q-Learning
and artificial neural networks.
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A suggestion made by reference [25] to refined to refine RL techniques involves
the inclusion of clustering to group periods that present similar tendencies, this
next step will provide the algorithm with more data to analyze, by assuming
that what was observed in one case can be projected to others that present
similar characteristics.
According to reference [42], scalability of the RL-based solution approach still
remains a challenge in solving stochastic games involving actual power net-
works. This is due to the complexity of the ac version of OPF that our model
considers and the large dimensionality of the state-action space.
2.8. Summary
2.8.1. Absence of an ACE model for the NEMS
While the electricity markets of several developed economies are being thor-
oughly analyzed and improved on with the help of the technique of Agent-
based Computational Economics (ACE), we have yet to see such a technique
being applied on the National Electricity Market of Singapore (NEMS). Dif-
ferent electricity markets have their set of specific attributes or characteristics.
Hence, the modeling of a certain country’s electricity market cannot be conve-
niently and directly ported to another country’s. This observations, thereby,
leads to the motivation of writing this thesis, which is to use ACE to investigate
better market designs for the NEMS.
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2.8.2. Drawbacks on current reinforcement learning
methods in ACE modeling of the GenCo agent
The literature review indicates the lack of a RL method that realistically model
the the strategic bidding behavior of the GenCo. Existing works model the
GenCo with discrete state and action spaces. In the real world, the GenCo
exists in a market whose state is characterized by more than one parameter
such at he time in the day and demand forecast. The actions of the GenCo
take the form of the submission supply cost schedule or supply bid blocks (de-
pending on the market rules) which are also multidimensional and continuous.
Continuous states and actions in high dimensional spaces cannot be treated
by most off-the-self RL methods.
Moreover, the traditional RL-based GenCo agent assumes a static environ-
ment and makes decision based only on experiences gained in a series of trials
and errors. RL methods developed based on the the Markov decision process
(MDP) theoretical framework, such as Q-Learning, may also not perform well
in the electricity market environment which exhibits non-Markovian behaviors.
The real world GenCo agent, however, recognizes that the environment evolves
in an uncontrollable manner over time and must make use of environmental
information in its decision making process.
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3. A Novel Reinforcement
Learning Algorithm for
GenCo Agent
The GenCo agent takes into account more than one parameter (for example
fuel prices, the time in the day, demand forecast, etc) before making an offer
bid. The decision it makes may contain multiple price/quantity tranches or
other transformed parameters. In other words, the state and action space of
the GenCo agent are multidimensional and continuous.
Literature review has indicated two limitations of current modeling of the
GenCo agent. Firstly, the learning algorithms are restricted to single-dimensional,
finite and discrete state and action space. Secondly, they are not adapted to
a non-stationary environment. It is clear that existing reinforcement learning
methods do not model GenCo agents realistically. The Proposed Reinforce-
ment Learning (Proposed RL) algorithm overcomes these limitations.
Inspirations have been taken from [52] which proposed a learning algorithm
that combines Growing Self-Organizing Map and Q-Learning. This algo-
rithm has been chosen as a reference because it allows learning in multidi-
mensional and continuous state/action space. The model comprises of two
Self-Organizing Maps (SOMs) and a Q-table. Learning will take place in both
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Figure 3.1.: Schema of proposed RL
SOMs, and the Q-table. It has been found to be effective in solving problems
in the robotic research area. However, our experiments have shown that this
algorithm is directly not suitable to model the GenCo agent. The Q-table
is not adapted to learning in a dynamic environment and the output SOM
updating method interferes with the learning of unrelated SOM nodes.
3.1. The proposed reinforcement learning
algorithm
3.1.1. Algorithm description
Figure 3.1 shows a schema of the proposed algorithm, including the important
components and steps. Algorithm 3.1 presents the proposed algorithm.
The state space perceived by the GenCo agent is denoted as Sagent and its
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Algorithm 3.1 Algorithm of proposed RL
Initialize nodes in SOM with random values within Sagent
Initialize RETable with NS rows, NA columns, with qinit in each cell
Initialize actors in ACM with values of uniform spacing within Aagent
For each learning episode t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...}
b← SOM.GetBestMatchingUnitAndUpdate(st)
propensityV ector ← RETable.GetREV ector(r)
probabilityV ector ← ProbDist(propensityV ector)
k ← SelectAction(probabilityV ector) // eq. 2.1
qbefore ← propensityV ector.GetPropensity(k)
a← ACM.GetPerturbedActionV ector(k)
Execute action a in the environment, receive reward
propensityV ector.Update(reward)
qafter := propensityV ector.GetPropensity(k)
δ ← qafter − qbefore




qinit : initial propensity
qbefore : propensity of action a in state s before update
qafter : propensity of action a in state s after update
action space is denoted by Aagent . Both Sagent and Aagent are multidimensional
and continuous. On the other hand, the reinforcement learner has a discrete
state space SRL = {1, ..., NS}, where NS is the cardinality of the state space of
the RL method. The learner also has a discrete action space ARL = {1, ..., NA}
, where NA is the cardinality of the action space of the RL method. The input
state signal, denoted by s ∈ Sagent, and the output action signal, denoted by
a ∈ Aagent, are both in the form of a real vector
The proposed method maps s ∈ Sagent to b ∈ SRL using the self-organizing map
(SOM), and maps k ∈ ARL to a ∈ Aagent using the actor-critic map (ACM).
The SOM describes a mapping from a higher dimensional and continuous input
state space, Sagent, to a discrete RL state space SRL. A SOM is trained using
unsupervised learning to produce a low-dimensional, discretized representation
of the input space of the training samples using algorithm 3.2. Self-organizing
maps use a neighborhood function to preserve the topological properties of the
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input space. The procedure for mapping an input state vector s ∈ Sagent to
b ∈ SRL is to find the best matching node with the closest (smallest distance
metric) weight vector to the s . The input state signal s directly updates the
SOM nodes, allowing the state map neurons to distribute themselves to fit
the structure of the input space over time. Each node in the SOM is mapped
to a row in the Roth-Erev table. The idea of using the SOM to discretize a
multidimensional and continuous environment state space has been taken from
[52].
The Roth-Erev table consists of NS propensity vectors. Each propensity vector
corresponds to a state b ∈ SRL and is a row in the Roth-Erev table. The idea
is to modify the Roth-Erev algorithm to allow it to take into account the
changing states of the environment. The value in the cell at row b and column
k is the propensity of taking action k during state b. The propensity value
represents the tendency of the GenCo to take an action because that action
has given good rewards in the past. The higher the propensity value, the more
likely it is for the GenCo to take that action. This propensity value will be
used to calculate the probability of taking action k by equation 2.1. Every
action in the propensity vector for state b now has a probability value. The
probability value of an action will influence how probable the action is selected.
The larger the its probability value, the more likely it is for the action to be
selected by the GenCo.
Each cell in the table is mapped to an actor in the ACM. The ACM has
two functions. Firstly it maps each discrete action k ∈ ARL to a real vector
a ∈ Aagent that is to be applied to the environment. Secondly, it performs
gaussian exploration [53] to perturb the output vector and it updates the
output actor to the perturbed vector if the temporal difference error is positive.
This is similar to many other actor-critic algorithms. When its sign is negative,
there will be no update away from the selected action because it does not
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guarantee that it is updating towards an action that is better than the current
output of the actor. Temporal difference in this algorithm is defined as the
difference between the propensity of the action before and after the update
by the Roth-Erev reinforcement function (eq. 2.3). The actors are initialized
such that their output vectors are spread across the entire GenCo agent action
space Aagent with equal interval between them.
The proposed RL method makes use of the multidimensional and continuous
of the GenCo agent. With the proposed RL method, the GenCo agent can take
into account more than one market parameter (for example fuel prices, the time
in the day, demand forecast, etc) before making an offer decision. The decision
it makes may contain multiple price/quantity tranches or other transformed
parameters that make up the supply schedule. In addition, this RL method
does not assume that the environment follow the rules of MDP. Existing RL
techniques which model the GenCo are unable to offer these features.
3.1.2. Self Organizing Map algorithm
As stated in the previous Section, the proposed RL includes a SOM. A SOM is
trained using unsupervised learning to produce a low-dimensional, discretized
representation of the input space of the training samples, called a map. Self-
organizing maps use a neighborhood function to preserve the topological prop-
erties of the input space. It is given in algorithm 3.2.
3.2. Global benchmarking
Global benchmarking has been done to demonstrate the performance of the
proposed RL. The AMES framework [27] has been chosen because it is the
only found framework that is open source, publicly available and thoroughly
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Algorithm 3.2 Self Organizing Map algorithm
Initialize the map with randomized weight vectors for all nodes
For each input vector x(t) do
For each node v do
Find the Euclidean distance between x(t) and Wv(s)
The best matching unit, u, is the node that produces the smallest distance
End for
For each node v do
Update v by pulling it closer to the input vector using:




s is the current iteration
v is the index of the node in the map
Wvis the current weight vector of node v
u is the index of the best matching unit (BMU) in the map
Φ(u, v, s) is a restraint due to distance from the BMU, usually called the neigh-
borhood function
α(s) is a learning restraint due to iteration progress
documented.
The experiments carried out for this case study are based on the a dynamic
5-bus test case, one of the AMES test beds. This test case is characterized by
the following structural, institutional, and behavioral conditions.
• The 5-bus transmission grid configuration1 is as depicted in Figure 3.2.
This grid configuration is taken from reference [54]. The transmission
grid, LSE, and GenCo structural attributes used is presented in reference
[55].
• In particular, the maximum operating capacities of the five GenCos de-
picted in Figure 3.2 are as follows: 110 MW for GenCo 1 (G1); 100 MW
for GenCo 2 (G2); 520 MW for GenCo 3 (G3); 200 MW for GenCo 4
(G4); and 600 MW for GenCo 5 (G5). Note that the next-to-largest
GenCo 3 is favorably situated in a potential “load pocket” with respect
1This grid configuration is now used extensively in ISO-NE/PJM training manuals to derive
quantity and price solutions at a given point in time assuming ISOs have complete and
correct information about grid, LSE, and GenCo structural attributes.
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to the three LSEs.
• Also, GenCo 4 (the “peaking unit”) has the most costly generation. Next
in line is GenCo 3. The three remaining GenCos 1, 2, and 5 have more
moderate costs.
• The daily fixed demand (load) profiles for the three LSEs are the same
from one day to the next. As depicted in Figure 3.3, each daily fixed
demand profile peaks at hour 17. These profile shapes are adopted from
a case study presented in reference [56].
• Every hourly, market is cleared and GenCos learn based on the cleared
price and quantity.
• The “net earning” outcome will measure the success of the GenCo. Net
earning is defined as revenue minus variable cost.
• The AMES framework currently incorporates in stylized form several
core elements of the WPMP market design as implemented by the New
England Independent System Operator (ISO-NE) and the Midwest In-
dependent System Operator (MISO), respectively.
• Generator supply offers are non-decreasing supply schedules accompa-
nied by minimum and maximum real power production capacities, as
required by the MISO (2007) and ISO-NE (2007). However, linear sup-
ply schedules is assumed ease the specification of the learning problem
for the AMES Generators whereas the MISO and ISO-NE require step-
function supply schedules.
• ISO-NE permits the generator to submit one supply offer to be used
for each hour of the Day-Ahead Market, whereas the MISO permits
generators to submit a separate supply offer for each hour of the Day-
Ahead Market.
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Figure 3.2.: 5 bus transmission grid for the dynamic 5-bus test case
Figure 3.3.: Daily LSE fixed demand profiles for the dynamic 5-bus test case
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3.2.1. Environment
Simulations have been done for both ISO-NE and MISO market settings. In
these simulations, there is only one difference between the two market set-
tings. ISO-NE permits the generator to submit one supply offer to be used for
each hour of the Day-Ahead Market, whereas the MISO permits generators to
submit a separate supply offer for each hour of the Day-Ahead Market.
Firstly, the simulation based on the ISO-NE market setting is run for 5000
trading days, corresponding to 5000 learning episodes. Daily, each GenCo
submits its supply schedule to the Independent System Operator (ISO) and
learns based on the daily net earning.
Secondly, the simulation based on the MISO market setting is run for 200 days,
corresponding to 4800 learning episodes. Learning is based on the 24 cleared
LMPs and the cleared quantities, a LMP/quantity pair for each hour of the
day. For simplicity sake, learning is done immediately after the hourly sup-
ply schedule submission and market clearing, instead of submitting 24 supply
schedules at one go as required by MISO market rules.
A. Definition of environmental inputs to the GenCo
As stated in the previous Section, the GenCo agent reads the market environ-
ment and reacts with a selected action according. It is described here what
constitutes the market environment input in the simulation under MISO mar-
ket rules in the global benchmarking experiment.
The market environment is completely characterized by the daily LSE demand
profile shown in figure 3.3. At each hour in simulation, the GenCo agent reads
the state of the environment which is a vector composed of three values: the
demand at LSE1, the demand at LSE2 and the demand at LSE3. These three
values represent the demand for electricity in the market at a particular hour.
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Table 3.1.: Summary of the scenarios
Scenario label Scenario
S0 All 5 GenCos use VRERL.
S1 Only GenCo 1 uses the proposed RL. The rest of the GenCo uses VRERL.
S2 Only GenCo 2 uses the proposed RL. The rest of the GenCo uses VRERL.
S3 Only GenCo 3 uses the proposed RL. The rest of the GenCo uses VRERL.
S4 Only GenCo 4 uses the proposed RL. The rest of the GenCo uses VRERL.
S5 Only GenCo 5 uses the proposed RL. The rest of the GenCo uses VRERL.
S6 All 5 GenCos use the proposed RL.
After reading this input information about the current demand, the GenCo
agent will propose a supply bid that is decided by the learning algorithm.
B. Scenarios
The simulations under both market settings are carried out under various
conditions. Firstly in the orginal default scenario (S0), all 5 GenCos use the
Variant Roth-Erev Reinforcement Learning (VRERL) algorithm provided in
the original AMES framework with its original parameters. Then in scenario
1 (S1), only GenCo 1 uses the proposed RL. Next in scenario 2 (S2), only
GenCo 2 uses the proposed RL, with the other four GenCos using the original
VRERL. This continues for all other GenCos.
Finally in scenario 6 (S6), all 5 GenCos use the proposed RL. The purpose
is to investigate whether the well-known “interference” problem exists. The
problem can arise when two or more agents in a game situation attempt to
engage in sophisticated learning involving exploration as well as exploitation.
Table 3.1 summarizes what each scenario label represents.
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Table 3.2.: ISO-NE base case result







Table 3.3.: ISO-NE result when a GenCo uses proposed RL
Average hourly net earning Extra net earning(%)GenCo S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
G1 2303 3800 5843 5761 813 +49
G2 2011 3159 5217 5138 626 +160
G3 46094 55852 72726 90986 87440 +24
G4 5733 12246 18747 22296 16771 +166
G5 10626 11351 15094 15502 10511 -15
3.2.2. Result
A. ISO-NE
The base case result under the ISO-NE market setting is presented in Table
3.2. The result for scenario 1 to 5 is presented in table 3.3. The last column
shows the extra net earning of the GenCo using the proposed RL relative
to its net earning in the base case. Overall the GenCos reported higher net
earnings except GenCo 5. Table 3.4 shows the results when all GenCos use
the proposed RL. It shows that even against competitors using the proposed
RL, the GenCos can achieve higher net earnings, except GenCo 5.
B. MISO
The base case result under the MISO market setting is given in table 3.5. As
shown in table 3.6, all GenCos have higher net earnings when the proposed
RL is used. Finally, even when competitors are also using the proposed RL,
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Table 3.4.: ISO-NE result when all GenCos use proposed RL






Table 3.5.: MISO base case result







table 3.7 shows that all GenCos are still able to acheive higher net earnings.
3.3. Discussion
AMES’s VRE learning algorithm applied to Generator i is fully characterized
by the following user-specified values:
• Mi the number of possible supply offer selections, or the cardinality of
the action domain of finitely many elements
• qi the initial propensity value
Table 3.6.: MISO result when a GenCo uses proposed RL
Average hourly net earning Extra net earning(%)GenCo S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
G1 1197 1090 1055 1071 1453 +7
G2 882 958 874 881 1164 +6
G3 23200 23933 29447 22929 23143 +28
G4 1702 1700 2574 1875 1968 +9
G5 8201 8345 8399 8188 9763 +16
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Table 3.7.: MISO result when all GenCos use proposed RL











Initial Propensity Cooling Recency Experi-
menta-
tion
GenCo1 100 552949.06 5529.49 0.04 0.96
GenCo2 100 538560.96 5385.61 0.04 0.96
GenCo3 100 4615108.99 46151.09 0.04 0.96
GenCo4 100 2148481.92 21484.82 0.04 0.96
GenCo5 100 2099525.76 20995.26 0.04 0.96
• Ci the cooling parameter
• ri the recency paramter
• ei the experimentation parameter.
In order to preclude the possibility that higher yield of the proposed RL is
brought about solely or partly by the selection of a different set of parameters,
the values of the five parameters used in the original VRE learning algorithm
have been chosen to be used again in the proposed RL. These values are given
in table 3.8.
With the proposed RL, the GenCo agent can make decisions that would have
been impossible with VRERL. The decision can take place in the full range of
the multi-dimensional and continuous action space of the GenCo. This huge
action space is discretized into only 100 action possibilities by VRERL. Such
improvements allow the GenCo agent to be able to act in new ways which
maximizes its revenue. The proposed RL has given the GenCo agent this
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ability by transcending the unrealistic restrictions brought about by VRERL.
In the MISO setting, it is important for the GenCo agent to perceive the
state of the market during the different hours of the day. VRERL is unable
to do so because it is a stateless algorithm. The proposed RL, however, is
able to make use of available information about the state of the environment
through the input Self-Organizing Map (SOM). The SOM adapts and discovers
the structure of the environment and transforms the multi-dimensional and
continuous state space into discrete states.
The core of the proposed RL uses the same Roth-Erev algorithm as VRERL.
Its strength arises from combining the input SOM and the output PS which
allow the agent to take full advantage of the multidimensional and continuous
state/action space. The novel Roth-Erev table is the answer to the major
drawback of VRERL of not making use of the state of the environment, which
is commonly believed to be important information in strategic bidding.
The superiority in performance of the proposed RL is the consequence the
unique features:
1. integration of available environment information with past learning ex-
perience
2. adaptation to changing environment
3. multi-dimensional and continuous state/action space.
The discrete output of VRERL is not suited to the multidimensional and
continuous action space of the GenCo. Only very limited action possibilities
are used by the discrete output despite the huge action space. The fixed action
possibilities have means to alter itself to reach the optimum action. The output
Particle Swarm (PS) of the proposed RL, however, is able to spread fully itself
into the entire action space. Moreover the perturbed action method allows
the action to approach the region that yields higher reward, as well as move
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away from the region that yields lower reward. It allows the exploration and
discovery of shifting optimum point even in dynamic environment.
The novel Roth-Erev table is more adaptable in an evolving electricity market





Simulation Platform of the
National Electricity Market
of Singapore
This Chapter proposes an auction simulation platform based on the institu-
tional conditions and real market data from the National Electricity Market of
Singapore (NEMS). The NEMS is modeled as a half-hourly repeated auction
in which the GenCo agents compete for profits. The virtual competitive mar-
ket environment is composed of several GenCo agents which can use various
RL methods to simulate their strategic bidding behaviors.
Firstly the market participants of the NEMS are introduced. Information
on the existing market power structure as well as future development of this
market are also given.
Secondly an Agent-based Computational Economics (ACE) simulation plat-
form is proposed. The platform is where the modeled participants can interact
with one another. The platform has been built on the open source Repast
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Simphony 2.0 Beta agent-based programming framework. The simplifying as-
sumptions are also stated.
Thirdly, the key algorithms used in the platform are explained. As part of
the effort to implement the proposed platform, the two important algorithms
developed are the Market Clearing algorithm and the Bid Sharing algorithm.
Finally, a Section describes how the strategic bidding behavior of a GenCo
can be modeled by a reinforcement learning algorithm. More specifically, the




This Section introduces the agents, or market participants, which participates
in the Singapore Electricity Market and how their decision making capabilities
are to be modeled.
A. Energy Market Authority
Energy Market Authority (EMA) regulates the electricity and piped gas indus-
tries and district cooling services in designated areas, and is also responsible
for ensuring the security, reliability and adequacy of electricity supply.
In the model, EMA determines the electricity price cap.
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B. Energy Market Company
Energy Market Company Pte Ltd (EMC) operates Singapore’s wholesale elec-
tricity market – Asia’s first liberalized electricity market.
EMC completes the connection between those who make electricity in Singa-
pore and those who use it. All of Singapore’s electricity is bought and sold
through EMC. EMC is like the stock exchange for electricity, providing the IT
systems, the trading environment and the governance for the market.
EMC operates and administers the wholesale market. This role includes calcu-
lating prices, scheduling generation, clearing and settling market transactions
and procuring ancillary services.
In the model, EMC collects the demand and supply bids, process the bids
using the Bid Stack Engine, clears the market, and finally informs the market
players of the result.
C. GenCo
There are eleven generation licensees1 in Singapore:
1. PowerSeraya Ltd
2. Sembcorp Cogen Pte Ltd
3. National Environment Agency
4. Keppel Merlimau Cogen Pte Ltd
5. Senoko Waste-To-Energy Pte Ltd (in its capacity as Trustee of Senoko
Trust)
6. Tuas Power Generation Pte. Ltd
7. Senoko Energy Pte. Ltd
1http://www.emcsg.com/MarketPlayers
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1 Senoko Power Ltd 3300 Yes
2 PowerSeraya Ltd 3100 Yes
3 Tuas Power Ltd 2670 Yes
4 Keppel Merlimau Cogen Pte Ltd 1400 Yes
5 Sembcorp Cogen Pte Ltd 785 Yes
6 National Environment Agency 251 Not traded
in NEMS
7 Exxon Mobil Asia Pacific Pte Ltd 176 Not traded
in NEMS
8 Elba Eastern Pte Ltd 50 Not traded
in NEMS
9 Singapore Syngas Pte Ltd 20 Not traded
in NEMS
Total capacity modeled 8285
8. Shell Eastern Petroleum Pte Ltd.
9. Keppel Seghers Tuas Waste-To-Energy Plant Pte Ltd (in its capacity as
Trustee of Tuas DBOO Trust)
10. ExxonMobil Asia Pacific Pte Ltd
11. GMR Energy (Singapore) Pte Ltd
Currently five of the licensees2 compete to sell electricity in the NEMS. Table
4.1 gives more information on their installed capacity.
1. Senoko Energy Pte Ltd
2. PowerSeraya Ltd
3. Tuas Power Generation Pte Ltd
4. Keppel Merlimau Cogen Pte Ltd
5. SembCorp Cogen Pte Ltd
2http://www.singstat.gov.sg/pubn/reference/yos11/statsT-miscellaneous.pdf
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While the Singapore Electricity Market Rules state that each GenCo can send
up to 10 price/quantity bids to the Independent System Operator (ISO) [57] ,
it is modeled to send 2 bid blocks.
Recent and Future Developments
• ExxonMobil to add a 220 MW Cogen Plant in 2011
• Tuas Power to add a Biomass & Coal plant in 2012
• Island Power Company Pte Ltd to add 800 MW by 2013
• Keppel Merlinmau Cogen plans to add 2 x 450 MW by 2013 & 2014
These recent and future development will not to taken into account in the
construction of the model.
Data above are combined from various sources3 4 5.
In order to quantify market power, the four-firm concentration measure (CS4)
of Singapore’s generation market by the installed generation capacity is more
than 95 percent. The market share of each of the three largest companies by
the installed capacity ranges from 22 to 35 percent [3]. The three largest power
companies in Singapore - PowerSeraya, Senoko Power and Tuas Power have
more than 90 percent of the installed generation capacity.
D. Contestable consumers
Contestable consumer is not individually model due to the lack of data. Their







This group of non-contestable consumer (together with contestable consumer)
is modeled as a single entity which submit a bid block of the desired quantity
at the price cap set of EMA.
F. Interruptible Loads
Interruptible loads are contestable consumers of electricity that participate in
the wholesale market and allow their supply of electricity to be interrupted
in the event of a system disturbance in exchange for reserve payments. Like
contestable consumer, this agent is not modeled.
G. Retailer
The retailer is modeled as the aggregate of all consumers. Hence there is no
distinction between retailer and consumer in this model.
H. Wholesale Market Trader
Companies, other than generators or retailers, that are licensed by the EMA
to trade in the wholesale electricity market are wholesale market traders. The
current wholesale market traders are:
• Diamond Energy Pte Ltd
• Air Products Singapore Pte Ltd
• Pfizer Asia Pacific Pte Ltd
• MSD International GmbH (Singapore Branch)
• Banyan Utilities Pte Ltd
• ISK Singapore Pte Ltd
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Figure 4.1.: Components of the model
• Singapore Oxygen Air Liquide Pte Ltd
• Green Power Asia Pte.Ltd
This model does not take into account wholesale market traders.
4.2. The proposed simulation platform
The NEMS is modeled as a half-hourly repeated auction under two different
conditions: (i) no Vesting Contract; (ii) with Vesting Contract.
A virtual competitive market environment (shown in figure 4.1) is composed
of several agents that have different functions in the market.
I. Modeling objectives
• Model the half-hourly repeated auction
• Model learning through repetition
• Collect the results of learning
• Vary market designs and assess their impact
77
Table 4.2.: GenCo vesting allocation






1 Senoko Power Ltd 36.4 20
2 PowerSeraya Ltd 34.2 18.8
3 Tuas Power Ltd 29.4 16.2
Total 100 55
J. Model simplifications
The following assumptions are made:
• Sufficient transmission capacity
• Non-discriminating grid access
• Inelastic demand
• The vesting allocation (shown in table 4.2) to the three largest generators
are proportionate to their installed capacity.
• Single-part protocol in auction market
The following aspects of the NEMS are not modeled:
• Bilateral contracts where the participants can specify and negotiate the
terms and conditions of trading agreements independent from the ISO
• Ancillary services such as frequency and voltage controls, load follow-
ing, energy imbalance, spinning reserve, and supplementary reserve and
standby reserve
The following simplifications are made:
• There are over 60 nodes in Singapore, each with its own nodal clearing
price. However this model simplifies it to a single nodal system.
• GenCo faces constant marginal cost.
• GenCo has zero fixed cost.
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4.3. The trading environment
In each trading period, each GenCo agent submits 3 bid blocks. The total bid
quantity by the GenCo must be less than its installed capacity and the bid
price must be less than the price cap set by the Independent System Operator
(ISO). The price cap is found to be 4500 SGD / MWh. Bidding takes place in
a static auction where the bidders submit sealed bids, as contrast to a dynamic
auction where the bidders can observe bids of other GenCos and revise their
bids sequentially.
The GenCos bid independent prices for each half-hour. A simple market clear-
ing process is used to find the intersection of supply and demand bid curves.
This decentralized approach does not require the ISO to make unit commit-
ment decisions. Instead, the GenCos have to consider all involved costs and
constraints in preparing their bids. Any physical or technical constraint in
a generation unit should result in a modification to the schedule. This is in
contrast to a multipart protocol which may include separate prices for ramps,
start-up costs, shut-down costs, no-load operations, and energy. Although the
multipart protocol can reflect the cost structure and the technical constraints
of generation units, the non-convex Unit Commitment (UC) problem might
not converge to a global optimal solution for large scale systems, possibly re-
sulting in inequitable dispatches for different GenCos [10].
4.4. Algorithms
4.4.1. Market Clearing Algorithm
The object of the Market Clearing Algorithm, sometimes referred to as Bid
Stack Engine when it exists as a component in the model, is to match up buy
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bids to sell bids. A bid is matched when the buy price is greater than or equal
to the sell price.
In this model, the bid is divisible. It can be partially matched without being
debited/credited the entire quantity desired.
The Market Clearing Algorithm shown in algorithm 4.1 is a modified imple-
mentation of the strategy used by current stock exchanges. The algorithm
successively subtracts the smaller bid quantity from the larger opposite bid
quantity (q(x) denotes the quantity of bid x). The algorithm keeps track of
the current unmatched buy and sell quantities at each stage using two vari-
ables, aband as. The algorithm stops when the supply bid has a higher price
compared to the demand bid (p(x) denotes the price of bid x). Once a particu-
lar bid has been allocated its exact quantity, it is cleared. The implementation
in this model is adapted from a simpler version explained in [58].
Competing bids are bids with the same price. In the stock exchanges com-
peting bids are are decided based on arrival time. But bids are processed
independently of their arrival time in the NEMS. The Competing Bids Shar-
ing shown in algorithm 4.2serves to distribute evenly the cleared quantity over
competing bids.
4.4.2. Use of reinforcement learning in the model
This Section describes how the state and action spaces of SAQL and VRERL
are used to model the GenCo in the NEMS model.
A. Defining Discrete States
The conditions of the environment in which the GenCo operates is discretized
into N states. The states exist in a single dimensional domain which is par-
titioned into N − 1 intervals. Due to the single dimension restriction, the
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Algorithm 4.1 Market Clearing Algorithm
sort demand bids and supply bids according to price
αb= αs= 0
while there are more bids in both demand and supply
if αband αs= 0
get next buy and sell
if q(buy) > q(sell)
αb = q(buy)
else if q(buy) < q(sell)
αs = q(sell)
else
clear buy and sell
else if αb> 0
get next sell
if αb> q(sell)
αb = αb - q(sell)
clear sell
else ifαb < q(sell)
reset αb




clear buy and sell
else if αs > 0
get next buy
if αs > q(buy)
αs = αs - q(buy)
else if αs < q(buy)





clear buy and sell
Algorithm 4.2 Competing Bids Sharing
sort demand bids and supply bids according to price
find and group of competing bids in demand and supply







if totalClearedQuantity = 0 or totalClearQuantity = totalOfferedQuantity
continue
else




Algorithm 4.3 Discretization algorithm
N is the number of discrete states




Create a vector, V, of N elements
For each i
V [i] = min(X) + (i ∗ intervalWidth)
Given xt
discretizeState(xt) = st = arg mini(|xt − V [i]|)
environment is represented only by the most important condition: demand
forecast. Demand forecast is discretized into one of the N states by the dis-
cretization algorithm, elaborated in algorithm 4.3.
B. Defining Discrete Actions
The domain of the bid quantity is discretized to K values and the domain of
the bid price is discretized to J values, both using the discretization algorithm
describe in algorithm 4.3. The total number of actions for a generator is hence
M = K ∗ J , because the set of actions is the product space of the discretized
bid quantities and discretized bid prices.
4.4.3. Conclusion
This Chapter presented all aspects related to the creation of an ACE model
of the NEMS. The rationale behind the selection of the REPAST simulation
framework has been explained. The decision behind the inclusion and ex-
clusion of various market participant in the ACE model has been presented.
The objectives and simplifications of the model have been stated. The tech-
nical details of the algorithms developed for use in the model have also been
presented.
The following Chapter will present the environment in which the ACE model
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is simulated, as well as the results that follow.
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5. Simulation Environment and
Results of the proposed
NEMS ACE platform
5.1. Simulation Environment
Parameters used in learning algorithms are given in this Chapter. In addition,
it gives the explanation on the data set as well as the necessary proprocessing.
5.1.1. Learning Parameters
Table 5.1 states all the parameters of the learning algorithms used in simula-
tion.
A. Proposed RL Input and Output map dimension
An input self-organizing map dimension of 2x2 gives 4 discretized states. Re-
sults show that this is an acceptable tradeoff between the amount of learning
received by each propensity vector and the number of discretized states. An
output map dimension of 5x5 gives 25 actions (i.e. the Roth-Erev propensity
vector has 25 elements). These 25 actions are mobile throughout the output
space through gaussian exploration.
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B. Q-learning parameters
The parameters and step equations of the classic Q-learning algorithm are
common in many applications.
C. Proposed RL parameters
These parameters are heuristically chosen due to the good results that they
give.
D. SAQL and VRERL parameters
The number of discretized states and the number of discretized action are 4 and
25 respectively, equal to that of the proposed RL. The three learning algorithm
are parameterized in this manner so that they are as similar as possible.
5.1.2. Data set
Data on half-hourly electricity prices and consumption is taken from the EMC
website1.
It is suggested in reference [59] that GenCos submit their bids depending on
the forecasted load and price by the market operator. Since the load and price
forecast in the NEMS is not available, the actual USEP will be taken as the
forecasted price and the actual load will be taken as the load forecast.
A. Input data
The input data set is the demand information for each half hour from 1 January
2011 to 31 July 2012. The data reveals that the price cap is $4500 per MWh.
1http://www.emcsg.com/MarketData/PriceInformation
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Table 5.1.: Learning parameters
Parameter Value
Proposed RL Input map
dimension
2 x 2


















































VRERL recency parameter 0.05




Table 5.2.: Data set description
























The USEP is the
energy purchase price
paid by retailers. It is
the weighted average
of energy prices at all







Period The period variable
represents each
half-hour of the day.
none int takes values







Table 5.2 gives more details on the data set. This data set will be referred to
as the data set of 2011.
B. Input data normalization
Each of the features in the input data is normalized to a standard score, also
know as Z-score normalization given in equation (B). The normalized value of






where µX and σX are the mean and standard deviation of feature X.
After normalization, each input data point is continuous and 4-dimensional.
The first 3 features (i.e. Demand forecast, USEP, Period) serves as input for
GenCo learning. The fourth feature (i.e. VCRP) is used to calculate profit
from vesting contracts.
C. GenCo Output data
Although GenCos in Singapore can offer their energy in up to 10 price-quantity
pairs for each facility for each half-hour [3], our simplified model allows GenCo
to bid only 2 price-quantity pairs for each half-hour. However this is not a
hard restriction on the model because the number of tranches that the GenCo
is allowed to bid is controlled by an easily-adjustable parameter in the model.
The bids from GenCos and the demand information from input data is pro-
cessed in the market clearing engine. The market clearing engine solves for
and presents the market clearing price for each trading period.
The last 48 data points of the output data represent the last 24 hours simulated.
The average quantity dispatched per half-hour and average revenue per half-
hour for this period of each GenCo is calculated. This output will be referred
to as GenCo output.
5.1.3. Simplifications
The assumptions, simplifications and non-modeled elements have been given
in the previous Chapter. However, the below summary serves as a convenient
reference for the reader:
• Sufficient transmission capacity
• Non-discriminating grid access
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• Single-part protocol in auction market
• Single nodal system
• Constant marginal cost of GenCo at 100 SGD/MWh
• Zero fixed cost of GenCo
• Bilateral contracts and ancillary services not modeled
• Price cap at 4500 SGD / MWh
5.1.4. CPU time optimization
Initially, the simulation takes about 30 minutes to perform only 5000 iterations.
JProfiler2 has been used to identify the time consuming part of the program,
which has been found to be the rendering of graphics. This feature is disabled
whenever it is not necessary. The result is that the entire simulation of 17520
iterations can be completed within a few seconds.
5.2. Simulation Results
The first part explains a series of validation tests done on the NEMS ACE
simulation platform.
The second part shows the simulation results of an experiement of the effect
of varying the Vesting Contract levels in the NEMS ACE simulation platform.
The discussions following the presentation of results provide more informa-





Validation is an essential part of the algorithm development process. To ex-
perimentally validate the proposed learning algorithm, all three reinforcement
learning methods (Proposed RL, SAQL, VRERL) have been put through four
test conducted on the simulation platform. The first test verifies that all learn-
ing methods discovers the reward maximizing action. In the second test, the
three learning methods are put into competition with one another. The third
test characterizes the stochastic behavior of the methods. The fourth test ex-
amines the performance of the learning methods when multiple copies of them
compete with one another.
The average reward in the long run is a desired criterion, which has been used
in quantitative comparative analysis of different RL methods [60]. In our case,
this is measured by the average revenue of the GenCo, either over the entire
epoch or over the last day.
In the computational electricity market, the main goal for the GenCo is also
to maximize the cumulative profit over time in repeated games. The better
method for modeling the agent’s learning is the one that can acquire more
profit during simulation. In order for the GenCo to maximize profit under
fixed marginal cost, it has to maximize revenue. Thus the average revenue
gained during simulation can be a suitable criterion to evaluate and compare
the performance of different RL methods.
The input data is the market data of the NEMS taken from January from 2011
to July 2012. It includes the half-hourly historical data for USEP, demand,
Vesting contract reference prices as well as other data which are not considered
in this thesis. This data is chosen because it is publicly available3, recent and
detailed. There has been no other simulation model based on this data set
3http://www.emcsg.com/marketdata
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discovered at the time of writing.
In all tests, the average of 50 runs is presented. There is no vesting contract
involved. The GenCo faces fixed marginal cost.
A. Test 1 (Monopoly test)
Objectives
• To verify that the implementation of learning algorithms is correct when
they produce expected profit maximizing actions.
• To compare the performance of the learning algorithms in a monopoly
scenario.
Scenario
In each simulation run, there is only one GenCo of installed capacity 3000
MW. The GenCo employs different learning algorithms under different runs.
The GenCo output, and its corresponding profit, is obtained for each learning
algorithm.
Expected results
In order for the GenCo to maximize profit under fixed marginal cost, it has
to maximize revenue, which is achieved by maximizing output and price. The
GenCo is expected to produce at, or as close as possible to, its installed capac-
ity. The GenCo is also expected to bid at, or as close as possible to, the price
cap set by the Independent System Operator (ISO). The expected maximum
profit is:
3000 MW * 4500 SGD / MWh = 13500 000 SGD / h
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Table 5.3.: Monopoly Test Results
Proposed RL SAQL VRERL
Output (MW) 2966 2861 2917
Price (SGD / MWh) 4380.23 4276.51 4392.09
Profit (SGD / h) 12 991 762 12 235 095 12 811 727
• Output refers to the average output (in MW) of the GenCo over the last
day.
• Price refers to the average bidded and accepted price (in SGD / MWh)
over the last day.
• Revenue refers to the average revenue (in SGD / h) over the last day.
The best learning algorithm is one whose result approaches this highest possi-
ble profit closer than the other algorithms.
Results
The average GenCo output and average profit for 50 runs are recorded in table
5.3. The result, that all learning algorithms produced actions which are very
close to the best possible action, suggests that the learning algorithms have
been implemented correctly.
In addition, the results show that Proposed RL performed the best in the
Monopoly test as its actions are closer to the best possible action than the
other algorithms.
B. Test 2 (Competition test)
Objectives
• Allow all learning algorithms to compete against one another and ascer-
tain the best performing one.
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Table 5.4.: Competition Test Results
Proposed RL SAQL VRERL
Price (SGD / MWh) 2941 2816 3042
Output (MW) 2021 1158 1863
Profit (SGD) 2981 430 1629 443 2839 153
• Price refers to the average price obtained by the GenCo in SGD / MWh
over 50 epochs.
• Output refers to the average power output of the GenCo in MW over 50
epochs.
• Revenue refers to the average revenue received by the GenCo per half
hour over 50 epochs.
Scenario
There are 3 GenCos in market, each with the same installed capacity of 2500
MWh but each of a different learning algorithm. The combined installed ca-
pacities are more than enough to satisfy market demand. As such, the GenCos
will have to compete against one another through strategic bidding.
Results
Figure 5.1 shows the trajectories of the reward of each of the three learning
algorithms. Average recent reward refers to the average of the rewards received
over the 1440 most recent episodes (the final 30 simulated days). The reward
received by the proposed RL generally outperforms VRERL and SAQL.
C. Test 3 (Standard Deviation test)
Objectives
To characterize the stochastic properties of the learning algorithms under real
market conditions.
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Figure 5.1.: Oligopolistic Competition Test
Scenario
The suppliers and consumers configuration is that of the Singapore Electricity
Market. All GenCos use the same learning algorithm.
Results
Table 5.5 shows the varying results produced by the different learning algo-
rithms over different runs. The variation arises due to the random components
inherent in the algorithms. VRERL seems to be the least affected by random-
ness while SAQL produced widely differing results.
D. Test 4 (Multi-agent Competition Test)
Objectives
To ascertain of the performance of the learning algorithms when multiple
agents are put to competition with one another.
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Table 5.5.: Standard Deviation Test Results
Proposed RL SAQL VRERL
Average (SGD) 601 3433 891
Standard Deviation 192 719 21
• Average refers to the average market price of the last day, and averaged
over 50 runs.
• Standard Deviation refers to standard deviation of the average market
price of the last day over 50 runs.
Table 5.6.: Multi-agent Competition Test Result
Proposed RL SAQL VRERL
Price (SGD / MWh) 403 443 361
Output (MW) 481 47 483
Profit (SGD) 97 052 10 503 87 304
Scenario
There are a total of 30 GenCos. Each learning algorithm is used by 10 GenCos.
Each GenCo has an installed capacity of 1000 MWh.
Results
Table 5.6 shows the average result of 20 epochs. Each column is the average of
10 GenCos using the same learning algorithm. GenCos that use the proposed
RL are able to earn more profit than the others. Figure 5.2 shows the trajectory
of the each learning algorithm.
5.2.2. Vesting contract level
It is intended to discover the influence of vesting contract level on the market
clearing price. The market is simulated for 25 times and the average market
clearing price over the entire simulation epoch is recorded. Figure 5.3 shows
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Figure 5.2.: Multi-agent Competition Test
the average market clearing price in vesting contract levels ranging from 0%
to 55%.
It can be observed that higher vesting contract level pushes down market
clearing price.
A. Discussions
This Section puts forward an explanation on why the higher vesting contract
level pushes down market clearing price.
Let us take, for example, an average trading period where the total demand
forecast is 5000 MW. The market conditions are similar to those under simu-
lation: the Vesting Contract Level is 55% and the total generating capacity is
8285 MW. This results in 2750 MW committed in vesting contracts and hence
only 2250 MW is to be traded in the auction market. After the three largest
generator commit the required quantity to vesting contracts, a total of 5535
MW is left to be offered to the market.
Without vesting contract, there is a supply of 1.657 MW which enters the
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Figure 5.3.: Average Market Clearing Price in various vesting contract level
competition to fulfill each 1 MW of demand. With vesting contracts, 3.285
MW competes among themselves to fulfill each 1 MW of demand. Hence there
is more competition among the suppliers in the market when vesting contract
is implemented. In order to have a better chance of their supply being taken
up by the market, the GenCos will be more willing to offer a lower price. As
all GenCos are modeled similarly, their homogeneous strategy of lowering bid
prices results in a lower market clearing price. Table 5.7 shows the tabulated
form of this information.
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Table 5.7.: Comparison of competition with and without vesting contract

















The main contributions of this research are, firstly, the development and test
of a learning algorithm that more realistically models Generator Company’s
behavior, and, secondly, a simulation platform designed for the NEMS.
6.1. Proposed Reinforcement Learning
A novel RL algorithm has been proposed for modeling the strategic bidding
behavior of the GenCo. It has been designed to model the power supplier’s
strategic behavior in order to obtain better response from electricity market
simulation. Benchmarking and validation tests have been conducted in two
agent-based computational frameworks of the deregulated electricity market.
An experiment within the AMES framework has shown the effectiveness of
the proposed RL within the established AMES framework. The experiment
based on real market data from NEMS has demonstrated that the proposed
RL outperforms the SAQL and VRERL in a competitive auction environment.
The validation tests shows that the power supplier using Proposed RL can
accumulate more net earnings in comparison with conventional learning al-
gorithms. Improved net earnings proved that it is a more effective artificial
reproduction of GenCo optimal bidding strategy. The proposed algorithm
provides a more realistic technique for modeling GenCo for agent-based simu-
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lation and it may also be useful for other learning agents in a repeated auction
environment.
The significant originality and advantages are as follows.
• Continuous state and action space reinforcement learning
• Discovery of structure of input space through a self-organizing map
• Exploration by perturbation in a particle swarm
• Adaptation in a dynamic environment using the novel Roth-Erev table.
6.2. Simulation platform of the National
Electricity Market of Singapore
The deregulation of the electricity industry involves a market mechanism that
relies on complex interactions among market participants driven mainly by
profit. Hence, a computerized simulation platform is a suitable technology-
based solution for studying the dynamics of a competitive market. The con-
tribution of this project is the development of a simulation platform for exper-
imenting with different market designs for the NEMS.
The utilization of the computer simulation model in this study has been useful
in assessing the impact of Vesting Contract policy of the NEMS. Simulation
results show that Vesting Contract policies indeed do reduce market clearing
price in the auction market. The agent based model is suitable for studying
a competitive market because in this case agents can be programmed with
artificial intelligence. The agents in this model have been found to be able to
make intelligent decision when making bids to the market.
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6.3. Future works
In future works, information on rival’s bidding can be incorporated into the
proposed RL method.
In the future, the agent-based model can be used to conduct more experiments
to answer broader questions such as:
• Which market rules lead to more competitive market outcomes?
• Which market structure are most vulnerable to market power exertion
by the agents?
• What are the implications of different conceivable policy measures that
alter the framework of the Singapore electricity industry?
• What are is impact of potential development in the power sector (e.g.
out-sourcing electricity generation to Malaysia)?
• How does the market efficiency in Singapore compare with other devel-
oped foreign electricity market (e.g. EEX in Germany and Nord Pool in
Scandinavia)?
• Is competitive equilibrium achieved?
To improve the robustness of the model, a comparison is to be done with other
simulation models. This is however not an easy task because the models in
this field tend to be proprietary and hence the source code is not released. The
Agent-based Modeling of Electricity Systems (AMES) is one exception.
To improve the completeness of the model, there are others data and param-
eters that can conceivably be integrated into the model. One such example is
fuel cost. The possible sources for such data includes:
• The coal exchange traded fund (ETF), NYSEArca: KOL, as well as the
FTSE USA - coal index (FTSE: WIUSA1771.L) from Yahoo Finance can
be used to derive the daily coal price.
101
• The Amex Natural Gas Index (XNG) serves proxy for the daily gas price.
• The data for the daily oil price can be taken from EIA.
While this model, like other ACE models, does not take into account cer-
tain market participants (retailers, wholesale market traders and interruptible
loads), it does not mean that novel modeling methods should not be proposed
to integrate the behavior of these participants into the simulation platform.
The platform can be use for simulating the potential impact of the following
experiments:
• Carbon dioxide emission tax
• Dynamic electricity pricing
• Communication of electricity prices to consumers in real time
• Load scheduling household appliance
• Price outcome of cross-border allocation scheme
• Introduction of demand responsive devices
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